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FK I? ROBINSON (**) 
Among more than one set of human beings 
and in more than one language, the World of 
people is divided into two simple categories. On 
the one hand are <(The Human Beings)) or ((The 
People)) (us) and on the other, all the rest of 
the potencial breeding partners of the species: 
((The Others)), cirhe Outsiders)), ((The Strange 
Ones)) (them). 
Myth has it that the Ancient Greeks saw all 
foreigners as being like sheep; they sounded and 
spoke like sheep. Hence the application of the 
word <<barbarian)). (It is perhaps noteworthy 
that ((barbarian)) and (<barbaric)> have departed 
from their sheep-like philological beginnings to 
join the most derogatory category to which 
others can be assigned - a linguistic case of 
a shifting Out-group drift.) In an early 
anthropological comment Aristotle noticed 
some heterogeneity among barbarians. Those 
to the west of Greece were ((physically strong 
and mentally stupid)), which made them ideal 
for manual labour and slavery more generally. 
Those to the east of Greece were ((clever, 
ingenious, but very lazy). Fortunately for the 
inhabitants of the cities around Aristotle, they 
were geographically placed to combine the 
characteristics of the west and the east, and 
perhaps with a string of subsequent possible 
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social science citations in mind, Aristotle 
invented the ((self-serving bias)) by allowing the 
Greeks to combine the strenght and the 
cleverness, rather than the laziness and stupidity 
- not a valid syllogism, as he should have 
spotted. 
Around today’s world, the binary division 
holds. Within Standard Average European 
Languages, we commonly have no name for 
Ourselves and just one for Them; foreigner, 
etranger, fremde, estrangeiros, stranieri, 
inostrannyi, and further east - gaikokjin. 
However, as 1992 approaches, European- 
minded people are trying to shift In-group 
identities to include a continental level. This 
gives rise to empirical questions within a 
political/moral/educational framework. How 
can we promote a sense of European identity 
as a ((good)) in itself and as a mediator of social 
progress - a means of enhancing virtues rather 
than  vices? For example, o n  current 
interpretations one might expect it easiest to 
achieve a stronger European identity by 
enhancing distinctiveness and superiority over 
other continental groupings but is the latter 
desirable or necessary? How might we achieve 
the distinctiveness without the down-grading of 
other continentals? Can we achieve a dual 
identity as Europeans and members of a State 
or Nation without the  two being in 
unconstructive conflicts with each other? What 
constructive myths are we to create that are 
more sensible and defensible than the fiction 
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of a (mation)) - a nation being a collection 
of people who invent and then conspire to agree 
on an untrue story about their common origin 
and are united by a common hatred story about 
their neighbours (see Bloom, 1990; Hobsbawm, 
1990 for a more scholarly analysis)? How can 
social and developmental psychology contribute 
to help to ensure that the means adopted to 
achieve the inevitable changes are consistent with 
the ends and that what result is better than what 
came before? 
For example, what will European justice be 
like in 50 years time? The English utilize an 
adverserial system in which a presumption of 
prisoner innocence is followed by a dialectical 
argument between prosecution and defence 
which is ostensibly intended to enable twelve 
citizens to decide on the facts of the matter and, 
with legal quidance from the judge, to bring 
in a verdict. The inquisitorial French system is 
an enquiry after truth, with no presumption of 
innocence and with a prosecution that appears 
to be symbolically stronger than the defence. 
There are three judges. The other States of 
Europe each have their own variant on the 
contrasting emphasis. Neither now corresponds 
to a Socratic model of an honest inquiry after 
truth via a disinterested dialectical process. A 
coming together of States immediately poses 
questions about the differential efficiency of the 
various systems in serving the cause of justice. 
Social psychology is beginning to accumulate 
enough results to highlight some of the 
weakness of the adversarial system as realized 
in various courts in the United States (0’ Barr, 
1982; Danet, 1990), with less work so far on 
the inquisitorial (Adelsward, Aronson, Jonson 
& Linell, 1987). It is to be hoped that such data 
will increasingly supplant personal prejudice as 
a basis for evaluation. But what of the systems 
themselves? What are their differential strengths 
and weaknesses and how should we come to 
transcend the prejudices which will enter into 
those arguments? Developmental social 
psychology would be obliged to point to socio- 
cognitive conflict theory (Doise Mugny, 1984; 
Gilly, 1988; Perret-Clermont, 1980) as the 
theoretical framework most likely to promote 
intellectual development and social progress, a 
context where opposed perspectives may become 
reconciled through the invocation of a higher 
order principle which exposes the partiality of 
the original arguments. Piaget cited quarrelling 
as the activity most likely to provoke the 
development of higher order moral reasoning; 
that was in his earliest book on the topic 
(Piaget, 1932). It was not until the 1970s that 
experiments began to show its potential for 
stimulating intellectual development across the 
whole range of problems where criteria of 
((rational realism)) have and can be applied and 
are appropriate. What has been investigated 
mainly with children of primary school age is 
equally applicable to adults and to all social 
arrangements, as well as to logical, scientific, 
ethical, and religious beliefs (and perhaps 
aethetic ones too in some measure). The English 
may come to see the necessity of improving their 
court procedures by adpting the French model. 
The French may adopt the English pattern. 
Both may adopt a European solution which 
minimizes the disadvantages and maximises the 
advantages of their own legal systems. What 
is true for court procedures is true for all social 
institutions. But as we shall see, the 
irrationalities and asymmmetries of human 
beings currently demonstrable in studies within 
the frameworks of Attribution Theory 
(Hewstone, 1988) and Social Identity Theory 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979), especially when applied 
to Inter-group relations (Brown, 1988), are likely 
to be granite-like forces of conservatism; we are 
unlikely to display any more vision than blocks 
of rock. But given another century, and we may 
be exploiting social psychology for social 
engineering, as we have done with the physical 
and biological sciences for material and medical 
advances. As noted, the legal example given is 
but one of literally thousands of rituals, roles 
and rules where questioning and evaluation in 
the light of empirical evidence could lead to 
progress. 
In the meantime we have to ask about the 
current position, and so far our knowledge is 
rudimentary. Several recent papers at the 1991 
British Psychological Society of the Social 
Psychology Section Conference showed that 
pioneering work is underway. In his sample of 
British higher education students, Cinnirella 
(1991) is finding that national identity is much 
stronger than the theoretically superordinate 
European identity, as one might expect. Huici 
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and Hopkins (Ros, Cano, Huici, Emler & 
Hopkins, 1991) reported that their Andalusians 
did not see that being Andalusian and Spanish 
were incompatible, but that their Scots were 
likely to see the British/Scottish choice as 
exclusive. Lyons and Sotirakopoulou (1991) are 
showing that British 16-19 year olds emphasise 
British distinctiveness from selected other EC 
countries and that this was particularly true for 
conservative voters, which relates to Cinnirella's 
finding that Conservative voters expressed lower 
levels of European identity. From across the 
Channel, Askevis-Leherpeux (1991) is beginning 
to chart comparable patterns from a French 
perspective. 
So far, authors of this work are being 
conceptually careful and circumspect in the 
inferences they are drawing. However if the past 
is predictive, the neatness will not remain. The 
history of the field shows it began with 
theoretical muddle which has persisted since, 
with the consequence that over fifty years of 
work on beliefs about and actions towards 
members of other groups is still plagued by 
definitional issues and muddled thinking. With 
the recent resurrection of <(stereotype)) we are 
reminded of these. It is worthwhile rehearsing 
four kinds of difficulty still with us. 
1. FAILURES n> DEFINE TERMS AND 
USE THEM CONSISTENTLY 
The original two articles that served as the 
point of departure for work on stereotypes 
reveal several of the confusions (Katz & Braly, 
1933, 1935, 1947). The initial core task set was 
the free assignment of adjectival traits to 
members of 10 racial and national groups; this 
was followed by further elucidatory inquiries. 
In respect of the definition of <(stereotype)) we 
read: 
(<We have learned responses of varying 
degrees of aversion or acceptance to racial 
names... we respond to him not as a human 
being but as a personification of the symbol 
we have learned to look down upon. Walter 
Lippmann has called this type of belief a 
stereotype - by which is meant a fixed 
impression which conforms very little to the 
facts it pretends to represent and results 
from our defining first and observing 
second.)> (1947, p. 40) 
((Rational prejudice is thus a generalized set 
of stereotypes of a high degree of consistency 
which includes emotional responses to race 
names, a belief in typical characteristics 
associated with race names and an evaluation 
of such typical traits)) (p. 46) 
When these statements are inspected in the 
light of Aristotle's prescription of a good 
definition they fail, and badly so. In the first 
paragraph there is a reference to ((this belief)) 
although only a ((learned response)) has been 
mentioned. There is an immediate combining 
of emotional(?) reactions and beliefs. How fixed 
is fixed? What is the evidence that the 
impression is inconsistent with the facts? In the 
second paragraph (<prejudice)) becomes linked 
to ((stereotypes)), although the preceding 
conclusion notes that the sample was 
antipathetic to both Negroes and Tbrks, and 
that the stereotype for Negro was ((very clear- 
cut)) while that of the a r k  was the vaguest. 
The adjective (<typical)) is used several times, 
but how typical were the traits? Of the 12 most 
common trait adjectives assigned to the 10 
peoples, only 7 of the 120 were put forward by 
more than 50% of the sample. The ((very clear- 
cut)) stereotype of the Negro commands 84% 
for ((superstitions)) and 75% for c t l ~ ) ;  the next 
trait was used by 38%. In a further analysis, 
Negroes required 4.6 traits on average to include 
50% of the sample. In everyday use, ((typical>) 
does not mean less than 50'70, and ccstereotypen 
implies a profile, not a pair of adjectives or 
less. Subsequently (<stereotype)) has certainly 
been used to imply that any example of an X 
that is not a Y is evidence against a stereotype 
and needs to be denied or discounted in some 
way. <(Stereotype)> has also paled into a 
ctcongnitive structure that contains the 
perceiver's knowledge, beliefs and expectations 
about some humam group)) (Hamilton, 1976). 
I t  will be much easier t o  proceed 
cooperatively and constructively when social 
psychologists have achieved a much better 
degree of consensus about the definitions of 
terms such as ((stereotype)) and <(prejudice)). 
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2. FAILURES TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN 
WHAT PEOPLE KNOW ABOUT IMAGES OF 
OTHERS AND WHAT THEY BELIEVE 
As Durkheim (1938) commented these are 
((collective representations)) of groups residing 
in societies and cultures. There are writings 
about them in fiction and faction, recordings 
in pictures, films and videos. There are 
monuments, and other memorials. There are 
oral traditions in the stories passed down from 
generation to generation. All these are potencial 
sources of information available for belief and 
use. Traditionally it has beeen assumed that any 
image is relatively monolithic. What do 
respondents have in mind when they check 
typical adjectives for typical Xs? The Russian 
stereotype? Male, middle-aged, shortish, stocky, 
wearing a fur hat and an overcoat, looking 
dour? No one believes that there are Russian 
women, children, youths, and pensioners. Most 
people know that there is great cultural diversity 
around the 15 republics. Many would subscribe 
to the existence of individual differences. 
However, if the task set presents a single heading 
and a set of adjectives, and if cooperativeness 
is more important than question-asking for the 
respondents, an image can be called up and 
used. What relation there is between these 
answers and the behaviour context is highly 
problematic. 
3. FAILURE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN 
MATTERS OF FACT AND MATTERS OF VALUE 
The quotations from Katz and Braly already 
claim that a stereotype is an ((impression which 
conforms very little to the facts>>, with an 
implication there is something odd about people 
whose judgements are not veridical. Once we 
ask why they are odd, we are defining the 
problem as residing in the person rather in the 
demands of the task in the context in which 
the data were collected. 
Explanations for the oddities have ranged 
from the more recent ((cognitive miserliness)) 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1984) to  the earlier 
psychodynamic accounts of ((authoritarianism)> 
(Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswich, Levinson & 
Sanford, 1950). In the latter, with its direct links 
to Fascism, there is a very clear moral 
condemnation of the presumed displaced and 
projected aggression. 
But the facts need to be separated from the 
values. How do Cambodians feel about the Pol 
Pot regime or the Kuwaitis about the Iraqis? 
Is it surprising that the Greeks and Armenians 
are wary of Turkey? The Jews, the Russians and 
the Gypsies have memories of Nazi Germany, 
much as the Chinese have of the massacres in 
Nanking and elsewhere. When States engage in 
mass slaughter, one does not need a 
psychoanalytic explanation of the hostility of 
the victims towards their killers. 
4. COMMENTARY ON THE THREE FAILURES 
Having cited Aristotle as a prejudiced 
observer, it is apposite to note that if social 
psychology had followed his criteria of a good 
definition of a technical term we should have 
wasted much less time and we should have made 
much more progress that we have. Popper (1963) 
may be correct when he points to the ultimate 
unimportance of definitions compared with the 
truth value of propositions, but while definitions 
are no more than matters of convention and 
consensus, inconsistent or undefined usage of 
terms such as ((stereotype)) is simple bad science. 
For Aristotle, a good definition of a term in 
a system was one that specified its relationship 
to all other terms in that system, especially in 
so far as similarities to and differences from 
cognate terms was concerned. Verbal definition 
is essential (if possible), but needs to be reliably 
recognized. Operationalization should be 
maximized and the inevitable fuzzy border lines 
of the category minimized. Until we begin to 
take more notice of such elementary desiderata, 
we shall continue to be trapped in our own 
webs. 
Likewise, while we as human beings may have 
feelings and value-positions about aspects of 
our subject matter, these have to be eliminated 
as far as possible from descriptions and 
esplanations of social behaviour lest they distort 
our observations. This presentation is 
underpinned whith a value position and treats 
social and developmental psychology as 
potential servants of that position, but it is to 
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be hoped that the interpretation of evidence is 
based on veridical rather than haloed or horned 
perceptions. 
5. FAILURES TO FACE UP TO 
COMPLEXITIES AND SIMPLICITIES OF 
HUMAN CIRCUMSTANCES 
An example of stripped-down social 
psychology in the area of inter-personal hostility 
to groups was the finding that attitudes to 
fictitious national groups were similar to real 
ones among ethnocentric people (Hartley, 1946). 
A neat demonstration of an etic possibility, but 
which has to be expanded into emic implications 
and limitations. 
A caricature of work in the area would cite 
replications and variations of this core study 
with American university students cooperatively 
accumulating grades. The explanations would 
be seen to be driven so hard by the push for 
abstract simplicity that the work loses touch 
with both the simplicities and complexities of 
the real world. 
In terms of simplicity the world is replete with 
inter-individual and inter-group hatreds; many 
of the latter are powerful enough to give rise 
to killings on a grand scale. In times of armed 
combat, it is as simple as traditional western 
films show: killed or be killed and minimize 
risks by shooting first and asking questions 
second. 
In terms of complexity it is difficult to know 
how to present and then contain the issues. The 
causal vignettes of Attribution Theory would 
not impress any other academic discipline if 
translated into sets of questions about history, 
biology, physics - or even psychology. They 
are a travesty of any model of causality. Some 
people may talk or decide to talk in such ways 
in particular circumstances to achieve certain 
ends or justify actions, but if any multiple- 
choice answer is chosen as the truth believed, 
it could be argued that the respondent is either 
too cooperative or too simple-minded to be 
anything but very ill-informed about the issue 
presented. Taking collective representation of 
members of other States (groups) as a topic, 
perhaps the following assertions might be 
hazarded: 
1. Especially for States with which there is 
a history of contact, there will be a 
variety of images of the State and of its 
people. 
2. These images will include positive as well 
as negative features, with the same 
characteristic occasionally having 
potential in either direction (savage versus 
good fighters). 
2a) The positive features are necessary 
during times of alliance, 
2b) The negative features are 
necessary during times of threatened or 
actual conflit, 
2c) Generally there are more negative 
features than positive ones - mobilizing 
armed forces is a major political 
operation and needs strong propaganda. 
3. Appropriate images are revived or created 
as and when necessary. 
4. These images will be just as relevant to 
inter-group relations within States as 
between States, from scapegoating to 
football competitions. 
Over the last several thousand years libraries 
have collected materials demonstrating these 
points. Currently the media, especially through 
the mouths of politicians echo the same stories. 
Given this kind of sociological-historical 
perspective, the happenstance beliefs of citizens 
which can be elicited at particular points in time 
are less important than the potential for change 
if collective action is needed. 
Yugoslavia, and the Balkans more generally, 
are currently displaying inter-group hostilities, 
some of which are a thousand years old and 
more. Hunyadi (1990) had longitudinal data on 
two cohorts of Hungarian youth across the 
political change-over from their version of 
communist government, showing unsurprising 
but dramatic shifts in beliefs about and attitudes 
towards the USA and Soviet Union amog other 
states. Since the 1812 overtures British 
representations of Russia and Russians have 
been required to yoyo according to who was 
believed to be trying to do what and to whom 
and where. It is important to document such 
assertions, and history texts are a readily 
available source in which to note some of the 
characteristics of the language used in them. 
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There already exist enough studies to illustrate 
two points: 
1. The status of these texts as authoritative 
2. Evaluative biases in their references to 
records of an objective reality. 
social groups. 
A third point of clear (terrors of fact)) could 
have been taken from the same sources, but for 
that, government public announcements and 
records in times of national conflit - part of 
the materials from which future historians work 
and newspapers, will be used. 
6. SECONDARY SCHOOL HISTORY TEXTS 
One current growth industry in Eastern 
Europe must be the re-writing of history texts. 
When societies switch from being relatively 
closed to open, or vice versa, history books are 
burned to celebrate hope or to expunge 
dangerous ideas. History texts are notoriously 
inaccurate and biased, so much so that 
UNESCO (1948, 1963) has twice produced 
documents listing criteria against which 
historians should check their texts. Before 
noting some empirical studies of bias in 
presentation, two preliminary observation may 
set the context, each of which renders any 
misleading information more persuasive than 
it might otherwise be. 
Olson (1980) has referred to and documented 
the authoritative aura of secondary school texts. 
Whilst it is true that the name of the author 
may appear on the cover, the style of the writing 
has traditionally been impersonal. Words like 
(<I)) are very rare, as are verbs of belief, 
supposition, conjecture and doubt. By 
convention there are very few clues, if any as 
to whether or not the statements made in the 
text are facts, personal opinions or consensually 
agreed views. The text usually appears to be a 
true record of what actually happened, and 
perhaps why events happened as they did. Until 
the late 1980’s it was very uncommon to find 
hints that statements were inferential and/or 
probalilistic rather than simple recordings of 
reality. 
To present alternative perspectives and 
possibilities was not a characteristic of the genre, 
and the ideia that quite different interpretations 
were defensible was not mentioned. Perhaps it 
is a sign of increasing honesty that the most 
recent Cambridge University Press texts are 
showing that the same sets of events are 
differently represented by different States and 
that this variety can be linked to ttwhy)) 
questions. For example, their volume about the 
large scale war around the 1940’s asks why 
different countries give it different dates of 
starting and stopping. ((The Second Wold War), 
is but one litle. (<The Great Patriotic War>) is 
another. Starting dates range from 1936 to 1941, 
with at least one country having good reason 
for recording the year as 1931. The year of 
ending is agreed at 1945, but while some books 
give prominence to May 8th, others refer to 
August. How long will it be before such 
presentations become normative and widespread 
internationally? 
By far the most common practice is for a 
text to report authoritatively presented facts and, 
as Fitzgerald (1987) notes, this means that any 
particular cohort of pupils receives one 
particular set of tablets of historical truth whose 
authenticity there may never be reason to doubt. 
Just as ctthe facts)) may not be doubted, so any 
uniformly biased evaluations of social groupings 
may be simply assimilated. 
7. IMAGES OF OTHERS 
History books making reference to groups of 
individuals will create images of those groups 
both through the characteristics ascribed to their 
members and through the actions attributed to 
them. Any social groupings can appear, but one 
of most common separations in 
politicaVmilitary histories is between ethnic or 
national groupings. In economic or social 
histories, groupings are more likely to be along 
the divisions of region, caste or class, gender, 
occupation and so on. But in both, the simplest 
binary division is likely to be between an ctUs~ 
and a (<Them)) - an In-group and the Out- 
group. For histories involving within-State 
affairs, texts have traditionally adopted the 
perspective that implicitly justifies the 
contemporary distribution of power, status, and 
wealth. For more inter-State perspectives, the 
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State of origin becomes the In-group. On what 
evidence are these claims based? 
The representations of social groups can be 
examined to see whether they are descriptive or 
evaluative, and, if evaluative, what the ratios 
are of positive, negative and neutral attributions. 
Social psychology has long made use of content 
analysis as a technique for generating 
quantitative estimates of qualities of texts 
(Krippendorf, 1981). Pratt (1972) generated a 
list of adjectives from 69 Canadian secondary 
history texts published in the 1950’s and 1960’s 
and divided the evaluative ones into positive and 
negative. This evaluative count multiplied the 
number of positive adjectives by a 100 and 
divided this by the sum of positive and negative 
adjectives. This index yielded a bias score 
between 0 and 100 with 50 representing balance, 
but does not reveal what percentage of 
adjectives are evaluative rather than descriptive. 
Pratt found three main results. First, the 1960’s 
books did not differ from those of the 1950’s. 
Second, references to English and French 
Canadians were both greater than 50 and 
therefore biased positively. Scores for Arabs, 
Blacks and (Canadian) Indians were less than 
50, and hence negative in bias. Third, if the 
text was in French, references to French 
Canadians were more positive than if it was in 
English. The results show In-group favouritism 
and Out-group denigration. The status of the 
third result is ambiguous; it is not clear whether 
the bias was for the author’s In-group, the 
readership or both. 
Garcia (1978) conducted a similar analysis of 
American secondary texts published between 
1956 and 1976. In these, references to white 
Americans were very positive and to Blacks less 
positive or neutral, yielding an In-group bias, 
but no Outgroup denigration. References to 
Amerindians and Spanish-speaking Americans 
were either very positive or very negative - 
idealisation or denigration. 
Using the same adjective list, Habtai (1981) 
examined four kinds of British history texts in 
general use towards the end of the 1970’s. As 
Table 1 shows the first three types of text yield 
clear discriminations: images of the British are 
positive and those of the Africans are negative. 
During the same period however, texts described 
as African histories were positively biased for 
Africans and neutral for the British and other 
Europeans. Unfortunately, the scoring for the 
European category was not divided to show 
whether references to the British remained 
around 70, and the Belgians, Dutch, French, 
Germans, and Portuguese were denigrated. The 
positive bias in the images of Africans could 
lie in the fact that authors of this kind of text 
were more pro-African than authors of other 
kinds of text; that is likely. It is also true 
however that these texts were sold in English- 
speaking Africa as well as in Britain - a market 
numerically over twice the size of the British 
one. 
Authoritative status and bias of reference, are 
not the end of selectivity. What is seen as 
important and what is not varies. What is 
offered as history? The political/military was 
strongly in the ascendant in British history texts 
until the 19503, when more economic and social 
histories began to appear. This attempt to widen 
the scope was resisted, even though these still 
adopted what might be termed the <(The 
Establishment>> perspective and - and 
portrayed the power elite as generally benign 
and concerned for the people and social justice. 
Only later did other perspectives begin to 
appear: first a working class perspective and 
subsequently female and ethnic minority 
perspectives. 
Without further elaboration at this stage, it 
is evident that Attribution Theory (Hewstone, 
1989) and Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1981) 
may be considered as primary explanatory 
frameworks for the discriminations for and 
against social groups. Although it would not 
be .difficult to cite travesties of truth from 
history texts, to cover yet another medium, it 
is easy to extract examples of big lies from 
newspapers. 
8. THE MESSAGES OF THE MEDIA 
To cite one work and give one example is 
perhaps sufficient to remind people of the 
capacities of the press and other media to 
sacrifice truth-telling to other interests. The 
problem is not new; Balzac notes the incidence 
of sensationalism of the press in early 19th 
century France. Knightley (1975) charts the 
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TABLE 1 
Indexes of Evaluative Bias in British Secondary School History Texts (from Habtai, 1981) 
TYPE OF TEXT 
Histories of Britain 
Cootes, R.J. Britain since 1700 (1970) 
Helen, P.J. Modern British History (1971) 
Knapp, W. A New English History (1969) 








Histories of Britain in the World 
Darvill, P.A. and Stirling, W.R. Britain and the World (1974) 
Nash, E.N. and Newth, A.M. Britain and the Modern World (1975) 
20.0 73.9 
30.0 93.5 
Ray, J. Britain and the Modern World (1974) 20.0 87.5 
Richardson, P. Britain, Europe and the Modern World (1970) 44.1 62.9 
Mean 28.5 79.5 
World Histories 
Case, S.L. and Hall, D.J. World History (1975) 
Cornwell, R.D. World History in the 20th Century (1969) 
Duffy, M.N. The Twentieth Century (1977) 
Howarth, T. Twentieth Century History (1979) 
Moss, P. History Alwe (1972) 
Snellgrove, L.E. The Modern World since 1870 (1971) 



















Addison, J. and Martin, P. Africa (1971) 
Davidson, B. Discovering Africa’s Past (1978) 
Latham, H. Africa-Prehistory to Modern Times (1972) 







* Scores are such that 0 = wholly negative, 50 = neutral/balanced, 100 = wholly positive 
history of war correspondents and their perhaps the most impressive cover-up operation, 
reporting from their first appearance in The with the public learning little from the 
Crimea War through the American Civil War newspaper about the scale of the casualties, the 
to Vietnam. Battles that did not take place were deaths from disease, or  the mutinies. The tactics 
given graphic descriptions, others which did of sending men with rifles <<over the top>>, into 
were suppressed. The 1914-18 War reporting was impassable mud and barbed wire to be machine- 
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gunned, literally in their thousands was not 
reflected in the headlines of the daily press. 
Vietnam may prove to be a significant 
watershed. Of Knightley’s wars, it is the one 
whose denouncement appears to have been most 
affected by honest reporting that defied the 
censors. The intimacy of the TV coverage of 
the Gulf War poses questions about the 
feasibility of open societies mounting operations 
in which they begin to suffer heavy casualties. 
In the same war the massive difference between 
the lowest and higest estimates of Iraqi 
casualties shows that information can still be 
suppresed by closed (and open?) societies. Of 
course what gets into the media is in part or 
almost what determined by governments and 
military authorities who are able to control what 
is officially released for reporting - and more. 
Two main messages emerge from an 
examination of media coverage of armed 
conflict: the first is that In-group/Out-group 
differentiation reaches extreme proportions, a 
differentiation so massive, it might cause one 
to wonder what function is served by re- 
demonstrating such effects in laboratories. The 
second is that In-group losses are minimised 
and Out-group losses maximised to and beyond 
the limits of credibility. 
There are classic examples of the second 
where the eventual facts are not disputed. After 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 
December 7 1941, the British Daily Express 
carried the headline Jap Plane-Carrier and 4 
U-Boats sunk)). (U-Boats was Express-speak for 
((submarine))). The first official U.S. 
communique was delayed until December 12 
and then reported that (cone old battleship and 
a destroyer had been sunk)). 
The reality was more devastating: 5 battleships 
sunk and 3 badly damaged; 3 cruisers and 3 
destroyers badly damaged, 200 planes destroyed, 
2.344 people killed. The full extent of the 
damage was never officially communicated. At 
various times up to  1967, occasional 
communiques and leaks raised the figures. Even 
today the official guide book at the memorial 
omits the data. 
Somewhat earlier in Europe, mainly English 
skies witnessed ((The Battle of Britain)) with 
Churchill growling out his ((never in the field 
of human conflict has so much been owed by 
so many to so few)). The British Air Ministry 
reported shooting down 2.698 German planes; 
the final revised figures was 1.733. Without 
touch a of irony in 1945 the Ministry appeared 
to be boasting of British honesty when it noted 
that the British exaggeration was 55%, whereas 
the Germans overestimated British losses by 
224%. More recently, the CNN network in its 
relayings of Iraq television broadcasts revealed 
how a steady imminent final victory of Iraqi 
forces was converted quite simply by Iraqi TV 
to an honourable peace settlement - on 
humanitarian grounds. 
These facts are consistent with the apparent 
assumption that national morable (and internal 
political stability) remains higher if there is 
minimisation of In-group losses and Out-group 
victories and maximisation of In-group victories 
and Out-group losses. 
Attribution Theory and Social Identity 
Theoryd become rampant in their applicability 
when questions are posed about  the 
characteristics and behaviour of the participants. 
If God is invoked, then He is on Our side. If 
Justice is invoked it is on Our side. The answer 
to which side started a war is, ciThem)). If this 
is impossible to contest, then it is possible to 
invent or use the idea of a ((pre-emptive 
counterattack)) or to argue that They forced Us 
to open armed hostilities. 
If it is asked why They are fighting Us, then 
there is a high probality that the answer will 
be because their leaders are insane or evil or 
both. The media debates personalise and offer 
a clear choise. If one were to list opponents of 
the western alliance of the last 50 years, it is 
difficult to recall an enemy leader who was not 
so categorised from Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin and 
Tojo to Sadam Hussein. 
The armed forces of the enemy are quickly 
denounced for: bombing or otherwise attacking 
civilian targets, especially hospitals and refugee 
camps; mutilating, torturing and killing 
prisioners and civilians; raping and killing 
women; killing children; and looting. Our armed 
forces do none of these things, and if individual 
combatants are ever identified as being guilty 
of such offences, they are quickly defined as 
being overwhelmed by the stress of their 
circumstances and discounted as exceptions. The 
same condut by Them is treated as normative. 
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Some social psychologists might suggest that 
this is a caricature at worse, a stereotype at best. 
They are wrong. Sadam Hussein and his army 
were portrayed exactly as this account claims. 
As with the distortions of winnings and losings, 
those who are presenting these images of Them 
and Us must believe that this kind of 
manipulation functions to improve Our chances 
of surviving and winning. 
A third point documented by Knightley (1975) 
is that dramatic reporting of war is good for 
circulation and profits. Most recently its 
coverage of the Gulf War rocketed CNN into 
astronomical audience figures and has given it 
a commanding supremacy as the channel for 
international news. Their sucess was not 
predicated on the same kind of operations as 
those mounted so frequently by W.R. Hearst. 
Of Hearst’s ventures, the role of this journal 
in the fomentation of the Spanish-American war 
the most notorious, and the most notorious 
episode in that surrounded the reporting of the 
sinking of the USS Maine. 
Relations between Spain and the USA were 
not entirely positive as the Cubans revolted 
against Spanish rule, and Hearst had been a 
belligerent interventionist before the possibly 
apocryphal exchange of telegrams. He had 
dispatched Remington to Cuba to send back 
pictures of the imminent war. In September 1897 
Remington cabled Hearst ((No trouble here. 
There will be no war. I wish to return, 
Remington.)) The reply was, {{Please remain. 
You furnish the pictures and I’ll furnish the war, 
W.R. Hearsb. The consensus is that Hearst’s 
conduct was by far the most influential single 
factor leading the USA into the eventual war. 
TABLE 2 
Headlines from ((The Journal>> 1898 
February 17 Battleship Maine Blown Up in Havana 
Harbour 
February 18 Ameriva Swept By War Fever 
February 19 Maine Destroyed By Infernal Enemy 
Device (Mine Torpedo) 
February 20 Maine As She Lies Sunk By Spanish 
Treachery 
February 22 Havana Insults Memory of American 
Dead 
After three weeks of a protective ccgoodwill)) 
visit, the USS Maine blew up in Havana 
harbour on February 25 1898 with the loss of 
many lives. The succeeding headlines of Hears’t 
journal are shown in Table 2. Already on 
February 16, the passive voice of <(blown)) 
emphasises agency rather than accident. By 
February 17, the means are identified and the 
idea of more than an individual agent is 
suggested. By February 20, the Spanish are 
indicated, and on the 21st the denigration is 
accelerated. 
What really happened has never been decided. 
The official US enquiry invoked the idea of a 
mine attached by a person or persons unknown, 
but had no evidence for this supposition. It is 
highly unlikely that a single device could have 
activated such devastation. It is highly unlikely 
that the Spanish would have provoked a conflict 
they tried desperately to avoid. It is much more 
likely that the explosion was triggered by an 
electrical fault or a smoking accident in the 
ship’s magazine. It is virtually certain that 
Hearst had no warrant for any of this five 
headlines, but this campaign culminated in the 
USA declaring war against Spain on April 19, 
even though the Spanish had by then agreed 
to all the US demands for Cuba. 
In September 1897 the circulation of the 
Journal was around 700.000. By the end of the 
war, it was 1.250.000. War can be good for the 
circulation and the profits. 
9. COMMENTARY 
Here then we have a host of dilemmas and 
difficulties for societies running their affairs. 
They create, sustain and store images of other 
groups, with a preponderance of negative over 
positive characteristics available in those images. 
There may well be several images available to 
suit subsequent circumstances. Many of the 
images are left dormant for most of the time 
but can be brought to life if and when needed. 
When such images are in difficult-to-destroy 
artefacts such as literature, they are not even 
likely to be forgotten. We might be foolhardy 
enough to re-write or add footnotes to ((The 
Merchant of Venice>>, but Shylock will be 
there in the wings waiting to be used in contexts 
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beyond the theatre (Breakwell, 1991). 
We can however change our current and 
future history books. We could set up societal 
mechanisms to limit their content, although how 
defensible restrictions can be devised which do 
not infringe upon the right to express defensible 
interpretations is a hedgehog. Physical scientists 
have the advantage over those studying people 
that, if the descriptions and explanations they 
construct are wrong, then the empirical evidence 
collected will eliminate their accounts from the 
accumulating wisdom. In so far as physical 
scientists agree on the rules for evaluating ideas, 
they have a built-in mechanism for choosing 
between contesting accounts. The resolution of 
disputes about human condition has some of 
the same uncertainty reducing possibilities, but 
even within human sciences the criteria for the 
evaluation and survival of ideas have yet to 
achieve a strong consensus. Beyond the 
disciplines themselves, their status is not even 
recognized by most people. In our scientific 
guise we are a new phenomenon, and we are 
a threat to irrational, untrue, unfair beliefs and 
practices. Why is it that individuals in Right- 
-wing governments are more than disposed to 
see sociologists as Communists, whereas 
Communist governments are prone to them as 
running dogs of capitalism? Even though the 
questions posed by sociologists are focused on 
descriptions and explanations, their answers very 
clearly intersect with issues of ideals, ethics and 
justice. Their questions threaten any 
authoritarian government. Elsewhere an 
argument is developed that the differential 
treatment of sociologists and historians among 
anti-open society politicians stems from the 
social implications of the worth of the former 
and from the implicit or explicit apologist stance 
of many of the latter (Robinson, forthcoming). 
Issues of ethics also arise with the media. The 
freedom to say or write what you like can be 
and is help up as a powerful slogan to justify 
too much. Originally put forward as a right to 
express dissent in closed societies, it can be used 
as licence to abuse and lie, as the Hearst 
example shows. Thucydides (400 BC) notes the 
essence of rhetorical abuse in his ((History of 
the Peloponnesian Warn. Balzac sniped at the 
press for its abuse of individuals and groups 
throughout this ((Human Comedy>. Today there 
is a continous running battle in England and 
Wales. Newspapers are able to print stories 
about individuals or run campaigns against 
groups or states with but minimal risk of 
indictment or consequents. On November 1 
1991, The Sun published three pages of abuse 
about the French under the headline, ((Up Yours 
Delors! D. Any individual citizen declaiming 
similar assertions in London’s Trafalgar Square 
could be treated as breaking the law, especially 
if the target group were switched from the 
French to  British Afro-Carabiieans. Are 
legislators incapable of drafting laws that can 
discriminate between rights to disagree and 
abusive lies? Is the executive incapable or 
unwilling to enforce such laws? 
The prospective research agenda for social 
psychology arising from such issues appears to 
be academically limitless not just in terms of 
explaining social facts as they are, but also in 
generating predictions of conditions under 
which disputes about both truth and justice 
might be resolved nationally and realistically. 
Alas, Piaget (1932) has already offered a doleful 
comment at the end of his classic on the 
development of moral reasoning. By 
adolescence, marble players are playing on the 
basis of universally agreed but negotiable rules. 
The rules themselves operate with a cooperative 
framework whose spirit requires that individuals 
who are squatting on superfluous treasure re- 
-distribute unneeded surplus to those who would 
have to cease to play because they have no 
marbles left. He notes that this morality only 
emerges as marbles thenselves case to be a 
valued commodity. The implications is that we 
succeed in being moral and sensible only in 
situations that are becoming unimportant. 
Perhaps this is an empirical generalization of 
some validity, but we have discovered enough 
now about ((learned helplessness)> and ((self- 
-fulfilling prophecies)) to know we do not have 
to be just victims of circumstance. 
Not all our current descriptions and 
explanations of human behaviour are destined 
to last. They do not necessarily ((travel well>> 
trough space (see Smith 1991). In the case of 
attributions, data from studies are over- 
-interpreted, frequently; statiscally significant 
self-serving biases or fundamental attribution 
errors are not equivalent to  universal 
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generalization. Some individuals do not display 
In-group bias. Some display Out-group bias. 
Some are even-handed. Our accounts of 
behaviour should reflect these distributions 
rather than commit the fundamental error itself! 
Too many write-ups of experiments maximise 
comments on the preferred points of the results 
and consign the rest to a dustbin of error 
variance. But where is the error? Is it in the 
unreliability of measurement or is it in the 
weaknesses of explanations? Eventually we 
should be aiming to explain the full distribution 
of the qualities and quantities observed, and 
not just show that a particular effect can occur. 
(We already know about so many of these 
effects, not from common sense, but because 
they have been observed and recorded, some 
from the earliest writings of the species.) 
Equally serious is the assumption that what 
can be found in a particular sub-culture in one 
kind of society will be found in other sub- 
-cultures of that society. University students are 
a very small social group in any society. They 
are not drawn at random from the constituent 
sub-cultures. Their age distribution is narrow. 
They are relatively clever and well-informed, 
while their role status accords them peculiar 
freedoms from responsabilities. Freud’s ideas 
are frequently dismissed now because his 
sampling was restricted to mainly middle-class 
Jewish Viennese women at the turn of the 
century. What is particularly unfortunate for 
social psychologists is that they are ex-members 
of their most common experimental group and 
may not even be aware of the variety of life- 
-styles in their own society; until they widen 
their experience they will lack alternative 
perspectives. A white rat’s account of the 
behaviour of mice may well not be generalizable 
to squirrels and hamsters. The chances that it 
will account for the behaviour of monkeys and 
monotremes are remote. 
Smith’s (op. cit.) analysis begins to  
systematize cross-cultural variations for just a 
few of the rrclassicab) experiments. (Interesting 
that no one has pursued a similar exercise across 
the sub-cultures in a society?) Within the 
Attribution/Social Identity Theory focus here, 
we can simply note that not all the history texts 
referred to show either In-group favouritism or 
Out-group denigration. In a Japanese sample 
<cability)> and rctask difficulty)) became a single 
factor (Omura et al., 1990). In that work and 
in an early study of Japanese students academic 
failure was attributed to lack of effort; sucess 
was attributed to external factors (Chandler et 
al., 1981). In our own investigations of self- 
-esteem in 13-14 year old pupils we found strong 
cross-cultural differences in self-esteem in the 
descending order: French, English, Japanese. 
Being a low academic achiever was associated 
with somewhat lower scores among the French 
and Japanese, but dramatically low self-esteem 
scores in the English. The cultural context had 
to be used to account for this pattern 
(Robinson, 1989). This is presumably the future: 
when appropriate social psychological 
explanations will have to be contingently linked 
to cultural variables. 
Finally perhaps many current results will not 
travel well through time. 
In terms of the theme here adopted neither 
attributional biases nor Out-group denigration 
are necessary components of human behaviour. 
What our theories currently aim to achieve is 
explanations for deviations from what is 
defensible rational and realistic. When 
judgments correspond to what is seen as a 
veridical perception or interpretation of reality, 
social psychology has no reason to offer 
explanations. When arguments are logically 
consistent, social psychology does not ask 
questions or offer explanations. 
It follows then that once we educate or 
otherwise encourage people to be rational and 
realistic, we shall have to consign explanations 
of crattributional errors)) o r  ((In-group 
favouritism)) to the history of social psychology, 
perhaps to serve as warnings of future 
possibilities. The data of today may disappear 
from future studies. (Which theories are 
temporary and which timeless is beyond the 
current brief.) 
In the immediate future, within the European 
community, leaders and members of each state 
may be obliged to confront and resolve 
alternative perspectives on their societal 
institutions, which may in turn encourage 
within-state inquiries into the rationality and 
justification of their unequal internal 
distributions of resources, opportunities, and 
life chances. Other world states are facing 
302 
similar confrontations as they fragment into 
smaller units, mainly upon ethnic lines. The 
down-side risks are frightening, and it is 
unfortunate that the political changes have 
a r i sen  somewhat  premature ly  fo r  social  
psychology, in that we have not yet earned 
sufficient credibility to serve in a prominent and  
constructive advisory role in the affairs of state 
that are now to be faced. 
At least we are in a position to offer some 
plausible accounts of what happens when 
people fail to be rational realists. We are also 
in a position to set down criteria which should 
enable disputing parties to differentiate between 
better and worse solutions to social problems. 
We can describe the differences those problems 
and those which are matters of  differences for 
which evaluation is not an order. If ever all of 
us are operating according to these principles, 
we will no longer need to discriminate ((the 
barbarians>> from ourselves. 
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